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COLLECTIVE COERCION 
SUSAN S. KUO* 
BENJAMIN MEANS** 
Abstract: When a collective-choice situation places coercive pressure on indi-
vidual participants, the law’s traditional protection of individual autonomy 
against coercion must be reconciled with its necessary role in resolving problems 
of collective action. On the one hand, the law might seek to remove coercion 
from the equation so that individuals are free to make their own decisions. On the 
other hand, the law might empower a central authority to decide, thereby solving 
a problem of collective action in order to maximize the group’s shared interests. 
The tension between these two approaches creates deep uncertainty for the regu-
lation of collective-choice situations. It is palpable in the law’s conflicted re-
sponse to corporate takeover bids in that applicable federal and state laws simul-
taneously enhance and diminish shareholder choice. Elsewhere—for example, 
the structure of government buyout programs, or the imposition of mandatory 
fees for nonunion employees—the intersection of coercion and collective choice 
may be overlooked altogether. By situating the literature on coercion in the con-
text of offers that exploit collective-action problems, this Article proposes a uni-
fying framework for identifying and remedying problems of collective coercion. 
INTRODUCTION 
When groups act against their own perceived best interests, the culprit 
may be internal collective-action difficulties or external coercion. Either type 
of defect in the decision-making process can undermine the legitimacy of col-
lective choice. However, an appropriate legal response to impaired collective 
choice depends on the source of the problem; bolstering individual choice may 
do nothing to resolve a problem of collective action. Yet, collective-choice 
problems are sometimes difficult to diagnose. 
For example, although lawmakers agree that corporate raiders should be 
prevented from using tender offers to effectuate takeovers at unfairly low pric-
es, they have taken almost diametrically opposed approaches to regulation. At 
the federal level, the Williams Act treats tender offers primarily as a problem 
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of external coercion.1 Accordingly, in order to safeguard shareholder autono-
my, the Williams Act regulates the form of tender offers, mandating extensive 
disclosures; prohibiting time-pressured, first-come-first-served offers; and re-
quiring that all shareholders be permitted to participate in a tender offer on a 
pro rata basis.2 These provisions reflect “Congress’ concern that individual 
investors be given sufficient information so that they [can] make an informed 
choice on whether to tender their stock in response to a tender offer.”3 
By contrast, state regulation generally treats tender offers as a potential 
collective action problem; individual shareholder choices can produce a collec-
tively irrational result.4 To facilitate more effective collective action, most 
states have enacted antitakeover statutes that give the target corporation’s 
board of directors a strong voice in deciding whether an offer is in the best in-
terests of the corporation and its shareholders.5 For example, antitakeover stat-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See The Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (2012) (amending The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964)). 
 2 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a Constitutional Review of the Poison 
Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1559 (2014) (“The Williams Act, and the rules that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has promulgated under the Act’s authority, extensively regulate the terms of 
tender offers. They mandate, for example, that tender offers remain open for at least twenty business 
days, and that tender offerors open their offers to all shareholders and pay all who tender the ‘best’ 
price.”); Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989 DUKE L.J. 202, 217–18 
(summarizing key provisions of the Williams Act). 
 3 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 97 (1987) (White, J., dissenting). Citing the 
Act’s sponsor, Senator Harrison Williams, the Supreme Court stated that the legislation “was specifi-
cally designed to reduce pressures on target shareholders to deposit their shares hastily when the take-
over bidder makes its tender offer on a first-come, first-served basis.” Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 
430 U.S. 1, 23 (1977) (citing 113 CONG. REC. 856 (1967)). In its disclosure requirements, federal 
regulation of tender offers is consistent with the broader approach taken by national securities laws. 
As Senator Williams explained, federal securities laws “provide protection for millions of American 
investors by requiring full disclosure of information in connection with the public offering and trading 
of securities.” 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1967). 
 4 Shareholders who refuse to participate in a successful takeover may have missed their only 
opportunity to cash out for a premium in a change-of-control transaction. Thus, a rational shareholder 
might agree to a takeover bid while hoping others will oppose it. If each shareholder follows the same 
logic, however, a takeover will occur despite widespread opposition. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 973, 975 (2002) (noting 
that “arguments for board veto could be based on collective-action problems that could lead share-
holders to tender even if they view remaining independent (at least for the time being) as best”). Pro-
fessor Bebchuk argues that a better approach is to ensure that takeover bids are not coercive in the first 
place. Id. at 976 (“In my view, once a mechanism that ensures an undistorted choice by shareholders 
is in place, the board should not be able to veto an acquisition beyond the period necessary for prepar-
ing alternatives for shareholder consideration.”). 
 5 See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evi-
dence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1854 (2002) 
(observing that only seven states lack antitakeover laws). Although the mechanisms vary, “[s]tate 
antitakeover legislation attaches harsh consequences to any large-scale acquisition that a preexisting 
board of directors does not in some fashion approve.” Oesterle, supra note 2, at 234. For a state-by-
state breakdown of the overlapping statutory provisions that authorize corporations to resist unwanted 
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utes often empower the target corporation’s board of directors to use takeover 
defenses including so-called poison pills as leverage to negotiate better deals 
and to deter inadequate offers.6 
State laws and judicial decisions that reinforce the authority of the board 
of directors make it difficult for shareholders to replace management by selling 
their stock to an outside acquirer en masse.7 Thus, unlike the Williams Act, the 
apparent goal of state regulation of corporate takeovers is not to bolster the 
autonomy of shareholders.8 Rather, to protect the long-term economic interests 
of shareholders, state law substitutes a collective decision for individual 
choice.9 Consequently, tender offers no longer represent a significant exception 
                                                                                                                           
takeovers, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition, 
57 BUS. LAW. 1047, 1057 tbl.4 (2002). 
 6 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348 (Del. 1985) (upholding poison 
pill as “legitimate exercise of business judgment”); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1083 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that a poison pill “has no other purpose than to give the board issuing the 
rights the leverage to prevent transactions it does not favor by diluting the buying proponent’s inter-
ests”); see also Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 5, at 1057 tbl.4 (listing states that allow poison pills).  
 7 Judicial monitoring can help to ensure that the board’s decisions are well informed and uncon-
flicted. See Air Prod. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 94 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“The idea that 
boards may be acting in their own self-interest to perpetuate themselves in office is, in and of itself, 
the ‘omnipresent specter’ justifying enhanced judicial scrutiny.”). As a practical matter, however, if 
the board’s judgment is exercised in good faith, courts will permit antitakeover defenses that make the 
acquisition “prohibitively more difficult” for the would-be acquirer. Id. at 129. 
 8 The more paternalistic attitude of state regulators in this regard is consistent with their general 
approach to securities regulation. See Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in 
Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 495, 498 (2003) (“As a 
general matter, the federal laws covering the flotation of public offerings were based on a full disclo-
sure philosophy, whereas much of the state system was merit based, allowing a blue-sky commission-
er to judge whether an issuer’s capital structure was fair, just and equitable.”). 
 9 Even though shareholders can replace directors through the mechanisms of corporate democra-
cy, that cumbersome and time-consuming process does not meaningfully reduce the power of the 
board to resist a takeover attempt. See Air Prod. & Chems. Inc, 16 A.3d at 102. A more detailed dis-
cussion of corporate governance is beyond the scope of this Article, but some commentators have 
argued that boards properly represent all stakeholders in the corporate enterprise, not just sharehold-
ers. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 253 (1999) (arguing that “boards exist not to protect shareholders per se, but to 
protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the corporate ‘team,’ including 
shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups, such as creditors”); Mar-
tin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Elec-
tion of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 189 (1991) (rejecting assumption “that conformity to stock-
holder wishes and protection of hostile takeovers are the primary goals of corporate governance”). 
Other scholars argue that state law bends to the political power of managerial interests. See, e.g., Lu-
cian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers 
from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1168 (1999) (arguing that “states have incentives to pro-
duce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers”). Thus, according to this view, “[s]tates have 
imposed antitakeover protections that have little policy basis and have provided managers with wider 
and more open-ended latitude to engage in defensive tactics than endorsed even by the commentators 
most favorable to the use of such tactics.” Id. 
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to an otherwise defining feature of corporate law: the allocation of decision-
making power to the board of directors.10 
So who is right? Are tender offers potentially coercive, or do they expose 
the inherent difficulties of collective action? This Article contends that the an-
swer is both—in situations involving collective choice, an offeror can some-
times bring coercive pressure to bear by creating a problem of collective ac-
tion. Unregulated tender offers represent a clear example of the phenomenon. 
In effect, collective coercion is a hybrid category and involves an offer made to 
multiple recipients simultaneously when (1) each recipient’s choice depends to 
a non-trivial extent on what other recipients decide and (2) impediments to 
collective decision-making prevent the recipients from coordinating a re-
sponse.11 
Identifying collective coercion as a distinctive phenomenon offers two 
principal advantages. First, the concept provides a basis for evaluating collec-
tive-choice situations across doctrinal categories. For example, this Article ar-
gues that government buyout programs designed to adjust coastal land use bear 
more than a passing similarity to corporate tender offers and can coerce home-
owner compliance in ways that have not been adequately appreciated.12 Just as 
shareholders must consider how other shareholders may respond to a tender 
offer and how those decisions would impact the value of their own stock, 
homeowners must weigh the impact of neighbors’ choices on their own proper-
ty values. In each case, the collective context of the offer has important ramifi-
cations that each individual offeree cannot afford to ignore.13 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See, e.g., In re Pure Res. Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 441 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“Delaware 
law has seen directors as well-positioned to understand the value of the target company, to compen-
sate for the disaggregated nature of stockholders by acting as a negotiating and auctioning proxy for 
them, and as a bulwark against structural coercion.”). Although the role of the board is broad, it is not 
unlimited; within certain prescribed areas, Delaware courts insist upon the importance of preserving 
shareholder democracy. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(holding that defensive tactics employed by management that obstruct shareholder voting will receive 
heightened scrutiny). 
 11 See infra notes 106–171 and accompanying text. Treated as distinct concepts, collective action 
and coercion have been thoroughly examined. There is a vast literature regarding collective action 
problems in general, much of it focused upon the special case of the prisoner’s dilemma. See Richard 
H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 209, 211–12 (2009) (arguing that legal scholars should use a wider array of game-theoretic 
models). Countless articles and books address the problem of coercion. For a particularly thoughtful 
analysis, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). 
 12 See infra notes 79–103 and accompanying text. 
 13 Although this Article largely focuses on corporate law and disaster law, we appreciate Cathy 
Hwang’s suggestion that collective coercion might also explain why so many people agree to waive 
privacy protections in order to access Internet services such as e-mail and social media. See, e.g., 
Claire Cain Miller, Americans Say They Want Privacy, but Act as if They Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/upshot/americans-say-they-want-privacy-but-act-as-if-
they-dont.html [https://perma.cc/KF7T-3GKZ] (reporting Pew Research Study finding that “55 per-
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Second, an appreciation of collective coercion can help guide the resolu-
tion of specific collective-choice situations. Although there is no one-size-fits-
all solution, this Article proposes several factors that can provide needed guid-
ance in addressing instances of collective coercion: (1) whether there is a sin-
gle, uncontested value that unites the interests of each affected individual; (2) 
whether the choice involves matters central to individual dignity; and (3) 
whether it is possible to structure a market to price the matter at issue. In some 
respects, the third factor—the plausibility of a market solution—restates the 
preceding two factors. A market solution will depend on whether the choice 
can be reduced to a price and whether the internal logic of market allocation 
produces results that are, for other reasons, unacceptable.14 
To be clear, this Article does not claim that coercion is always undesira-
ble.15 This Article separates the analytic question—is something coercive—
from its possible normative justification.16 Coercive tactics further goals that 
may be of overriding importance, especially when the state is involved: pro-
tecting communities from crime; reducing unsafe and economically unsustain-
able land use choices; and, perhaps, facilitating collective bargaining strategies 
in the workplace.17 Even a “prisoner’s dilemma” may not be troubling when it 
                                                                                                                           
cent of people say they are willing to share information about themselves with web companies in 
order to use their services free”). Internet companies would surely argue that they are providing valu-
able services, often without charge, and that each user can decide whether the tradeoff of privacy for 
access is worthwhile. Yet, each individual’s choice is deeply affected by the wider context. To turn 
down Internet access is to be excluded from much of modern life. Someone who chooses to remain 
“off the grid” cannot find information that now exists only online and cannot communicate with 
friends who have replaced letters and holiday cards with e-mails and Facebook posts. Accordingly, 
companies that offer Internet access and services have effectively altered the baseline for choice. For 
examples of Internet policies that describe the massive amounts of data collected and the use of that 
data, among other things, to sell advertising targeted to specific users, see Data Policy, FACEBOOK,  
https://www.facebook.com/policy.php [https://perma.cc/9D78-X447] and Privacy & Terms, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/C3BL-RA5P]. 
 14 Ultimately, the choice of remedy turns on policy considerations. Thus, collective coercion is a 
useful reminder that the value of individual autonomy cannot be separated from what social justice 
demands: that the benefits and burdens of society be allocated fairly. 
 15 See Peter Westen, “Freedom” and “Coercion”—Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE 
L.J. 541, 548 (“There is nothing contradictory about the notion of justified or legitimate coercion.”). 
 16 Notably, this Article does not seek to address whether coercive pressure in any particular con-
text affords a legal justification or excuse for the party subject to the coercive pressure. As other 
scholars have stated, such an inquiry would be inescapably normative. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1443–44 (1989) (analyzing the doctrine of 
duress). 
 17 See Westen, supra note 15, at 547–48 (noting that “[l]ike freedom, coercion is a single concept 
that is sufficiently open-textured to encompass a range of diverse and mutually inconsistent norms. 
Thus, both sides to the dispute in America over concerted union activity stated their positions in the 
language of ‘coercion’”). 
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takes place in the situation for which it was named.18 Regardless of justifica-
tion, however, the use of coercion to achieve policy objectives should be trans-
parent and subject to democratic deliberation, not obscured by a disingenuous 
language of individual choice. 
Part I of this Article reviews the separate literatures concerning coercion 
and collective action. Part II collapses the distinction, showing that an offeror 
can structure a collective-action problem to coerce a desired outcome. Part III 
defends a flexible framework for responding to collective coercion, either by 
protecting individual choice or by empowering a single decision maker to act 
in the best interests of all affected individuals. 
I. COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
There are two distinct threats to voluntary, individual choice in a collec-
tive context. Individuals may be coerced into compliance if they are threatened 
with negative consequences. Alternatively, even if individuals are ostensibly 
free to choose in their own self-interest, the perverse logic of collective action 
may make it difficult or impossible for them to achieve shared goals.19 
A. Offers, Threats, and Baselines 
One of the law’s most basic functions is to safeguard individuals from co-
ercion.20 For example, duress can vitiate the consent necessary to form a con-
tract.21 Likewise, because of the perceived danger of forced confessions, 
statements elicited during a custodial interrogation cannot be used in court un-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Within constitutional boundaries, the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses is not 
supposed to be a fair contest in which the suspect has a sporting chance of getting away with it. 
 19 This Article does not claim that individual choice must be divorced from social context to be 
voluntary. Not only would such a standard be unrealistic, but also we do not wish to suggest that hu-
man beings should aspire to make decisions without regard to the judgment of those whose values and 
interests they have reason to care about. Rather, we assume that individuals will form preferences with 
due regard for the interests of others, and we focus more narrowly on collective-choice situations that 
obstruct the ability of individuals to choose in accordance with those preferences. 
 20 Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 718 (2005) (“To 
achieve the ideal of individual freedom and autonomy, society must provide relief against coercion.”). 
 21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that 
contract is voidable if “induced by an improper threat . . . that leaves the victim no reasonable alterna-
tive”); John P. Dawson, Economic Duress—an Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 254–56 
(1947) (describing expansion of duress doctrine to include economic as well as physical threats). Con-
tractual modifications are also generally voidable if coerced “by a wrongful threat to breach. 7 AR-
THUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.6 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2002); see 
Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of 
Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 880–81 (1979) (noting that the concept of duress encom-
passes economic threats). 
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less the suspect received Miranda warnings.22 Heavy-handed tactics that con-
stitute blackmail or extortion may even be subject to criminal prosecution.23 In 
order to establish coercion, the law generally requires “that the plaintiff show 
that the other party by wrongful acts or threats, intentionally caused him to 
involuntarily enter into a particular transaction.”24 
When a proposal does not involve “force or fraud,”25 the issue of coercion 
turns on the existence of a threat. Thus, the law must distinguish neutral offers 
and coercive threats. As the philosopher Robert Nozick observed, both involve 
contingent proposals; if the recipient does (or refrains from doing) something, 
a consequence follows.26 Depending on the significance of the consequence, 
the recipient of the proposal may have little choice but to comply.27 Moreover, 
threats can be rephrased as offers, and vice versa. For example, “your money 
or your life” is still a threat even if phrased as an offer to preserve your life in 
exchange for your money.28 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda 
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 944 (1995). 
 23 See Paul H. Robinson et al., Competing Theories of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Cri-
tique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 TEX. L. REV. 291, 293 (2010). For similar reasons, duress can be a 
defense to criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2006). 
 24 Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15, 22 (Alaska 
1978); see also Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 20, at 718 (“Coercion occurs when an individual is 
placed under a threat: ‘Commit a requested act (or refrain from an act), or else an undesirable outcome 
will be inflicted upon you.’”); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expan-
sion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (2013) (“To 
a first approximation, coercion is the wrong of exerting wrongful pressure on a subject to do as the 
coercer wishes.”). Coercion does not require physical compulsion or the total absence of alternatives; 
a choice can be involuntary even if the coerced party had, in theory, the power to refuse. See Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918) (stating that “[w]ere it otherwise, 
as conduct under duress involves a choice, it always would be possible for a State to impose an un-
constitutional burden by the threat of penalties worse than it in case of a failure to accept it, and then 
to declare the acceptance voluntary”). The degree of compulsion may affect the law’s willingness to 
accept coercion as a justification or excuse for some obligation of the coerced party, but the specific 
legal implications of coercion in various legal contexts are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 25 Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1443 (“In a wide variety of private and criminal settings, the law 
condemns offers as coercive even in the absence of force or fraud.”). 
 26 Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
ERNEST NAGEL 440, 464 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969) (“[I]f P coerces Q into not doing A 
then (part of) Q’s reason for not doing A is to avoid or lessen the likelihood of P’s threatened conse-
quence.”). 
 27 It is important to note, however, that the concept of coercion does not require a complete ab-
sence of choice in the face of a threat. Cf. Berman, supra note 24, at 1292 (noting that, unlike coer-
cion, “one is compelled to do such-and-such, or is subject to compulsion, when there is some coherent 
sense in which one could not have done otherwise”). An individual may, of course, be both coerced 
and compelled. Id. 
 28 See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 51 (1982) (“[O]ne may often invert goods and 
bads, just as, with a bit of creaking in his logic, a robber with a gun might claim to be offering contin-
ued life rather than threatening quick death.”); Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justi-
fying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1337 (1989) (“The 
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Rather than focusing on the form of an offer, the standard method for 
identifying coercion is to ask whether the offer alters the recipient’s baseline 
for choice.29 Regardless of whether a proposal is framed as a threat or an offer, 
it is coercive if it leaves the recipient in a worse position—most crudely, “do 
what I say, or else.” By contrast, a non-coercive proposal may improve the re-
cipient’s position by offering an opportunity. In any case, whether or not the 
offer is accepted, what is important is that the recipient of the offer will be left 
no worse off than before. 
For an offer to be coercive, the offeror must also have causal, if not moral 
responsibility for any adverse, contingent consequences.30 “Your money or 
your life” is a threat because it indicates that the offeror intends to kill the of-
feree unless the money is paid. However, a superficially similar catchphrase 
from the Terminator movies—“Come with me if you want to live”—is not co-
ercive so long as the offeror’s terms are independent of the killer cyborg’s pro-
gramming.31 Thus, even though it would be foolish to turn down, an offer of 
assistance under those circumstances does not diminish the recipient’s baseline 
for choice.32 
The definition of coercion adopted here does not encompass all colloquial 
uses of the term. For example, this Article sets aside cases in which some vul-
nerability in the offeree precludes autonomous choice. Someone who is starv-
                                                                                                                           
typical coercer ‘tempts’ her victim with his life.” (citing LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: 
CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 70 (1987))). 
 29 See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 1448 n.142 (“[C]ommentators writing in Nozick’s wake agree 
with the basic premise of his article: that coercive proposals (‘threats,’ in Nozick’s terminology), 
unlike noncoercive proposals (‘offers,’ in Nozick’s terminology), involve a departure from some base-
line of ‘the normal or natural or expected course of events’ that makes the recipient worse off.”). 
 30 Scholars have engaged in protracted debate regarding the nature of baselines for purposes of coer-
cion analysis and whether it is possible to identify a “nonmoral” baseline. See, e.g., WERTHEIMER, supra 
note 11, at 207 (noting that in the case of someone who offers to rescue another person who is drowning 
for $10,000, “whether A is making an offer or a threat will depend on what is ‘normal’ in their society”). 
One scholar contends that the concept of a baseline should be disaggregated into three different baselines. 
See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1293, 1352 (1984). 
 31 This familiar phrase is employed throughout the Terminator movie franchise. See THE TERMI-
NATOR (Orion Pictures 1984) (said by Kyle Reese to Sarah Connor); TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY 
(TriStar Pictures 1991) (said by T-800 to Sarah Connor); TERMINATOR GENISYS (Paramount Pictures 
2015) (said by Sarah Connor to Kyle Reese); TERMINATOR SALVATION (Warner Bros. 2009) (said by 
Kyle Reese to Marcus Wright). On one occasion a variant, “Do you want to live? Come on!” was 
used. See TERMINATOR 3: RISE OF THE MACHINES (Warner Bros. 2003) (said by John Connor to Kate 
Brewster). The phrase has also been used in a Terminator television series. See Terminator: The Sarah 
Connor Chronicles (Warner Bros. Television & C2 Pictures 2008–09). 
 32 How one might reduce the baseline for choice of a person already being pursued by a killer 
robot from the future is difficult to imagine. However, if the proposal were, “Give me all your money, 
if you want to live,” then the rescuer would be guilty of extortion. See Sullivan, supra note 16, at 
1444–45 (discussing blackmail, extortion, and other “example[s] of how a threat to do what one has a 
right to do can be treated as coercive”). 
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ing cannot afford to refuse an offer of employment, however paltry the terms, 
but this sort of positional coercion based on external circumstances is beyond 
the scope of our argument. Thus, we do not claim that transactions in a market 
economy are involuntary simply because the market is characterized by high 
levels of economic inequality. Beyond a certain level of inequality, that may be 
true. We assume without arguing the point that a minimum level of resources 
and opportunities is a necessary part of liberty.33 In distinguishing offers and 
threats, however, we take it as a given that the recipients of an offer are not 
unduly constrained by their individual circumstances, though, as discussed in 
the next section, they may be enmeshed by collective-action difficulties. 
B. The Logic of Collective Action 
A system of ordered liberty requires constraint as well as license.34 Alt-
hough the law generally empowers individuals to make their own choices, rec-
ognizing the intrinsic value of autonomy and its ability to produce more social 
welfare than centralized planning could achieve,35 individual choices do not 
always produce sensible outcomes from a collective standpoint.36 For example, 
all members of society benefit from roads, national security, and other public 
goods,37 but they may be tempted to free ride, enjoying those benefits without 
paying for them. If others contribute, a citizen might reason, “my own efforts 
will not matter; if others do not pay their share, why should I contribute to a 
lost cause?” Yet, if each citizen adopts the same rational stance, society will 
under-produce collective goods to the disadvantage of all citizens.38 
                                                                                                                           
 33 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 171 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002) (citing 
with approval the argument “that there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom 
which must on no account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an 
area too narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties”). 
 34 See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 15 (1974) (postulating that “the 
demands of society and the needs of the individual, expressed indeed only within that society, require 
that he be for others as well as for himself, that the others appear as ends to him as well as means”). 
 35 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945) 
(arguing that markets provide an efficient mechanism for gathering information that is widely distrib-
uted among members of a society and impounding it in the price of goods and services). 
 36 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 2 (1965) (arguing that “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or un-
less there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, 
rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”). 
 37 See HARDIN, supra note 28, at 17 (“Public goods are defined by two properties: jointness of 
supply and impossibility of exclusion.”). Notably, problems involving collective action need not in-
volve “pure” public goods. See id. at 19 (observing that when unions “seek better pay for their mem-
bers,” the individual worker’s wages are distinct but the new rate “benefits all the relevant workers so 
that one worker’s receipt of the higher rate does not reduce the rate available to others”). 
 38 See Susan S. Kuo, Speaking in Tongues: Mandating Multilingual Disaster Warnings in the 
Public Interest, 14 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 3, 42–43 (2007) (“[P]ublic safety services are a 
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In this regard, it is important to recognize that collective action is not a 
threat to individual liberty. Quite the opposite, “[c]ollective action is a means 
of power, a means by which individuals can more fully realize their individual 
values.”39 Collective-action problems leave individuals less free because they 
cannot coordinate their choices in order to achieve shared goals. Even though 
all individuals choose rationally and in their own self-interest, they end up with 
a result that none would have wanted. 
The Tragedy of the Commons provides a classic example.40 There is a 
single pasture open to all for the grazing of cattle and the shepherds that use 
the pasture have an individual incentive to maximize the size of their herd.41 
Unfortunately, the pasture has reached its capacity for cattle and will be de-
stroyed unless the shepherds control the size of their herds.42 If the shepherds 
have no way of coordinating their activities, then “the inherent logic of the 
commons remorselessly generates tragedy.”43 Despite the collective conse-
quences, the shepherds have reason to add cattle to their herds. Each shepherd 
captures individually the full value of additional cattle but shares the “effects 
of overgrazing.”44 Consequently, the absence of a coercive mechanism leaves 
the shepherds unable to preserve the pasture upon which they all depend. 
By making contributions mandatory, however, the state can break the de-
structive, self-defeating logic that threatens to stymie collective action.45 If 
                                                                                                                           
noteworthy example of a public good that is typically under-produced in the marketplace.”). Free 
riding becomes more likely as the individual benefit of contributing to a collective good is reduced. 
The “ratio of benefits to costs” matters because if “that ratio is very large, then a relatively small frac-
tion of the whole group would already stand to benefit, even if that fractional subgroup alone paid the 
full cost of the group good.” HARDIN, supra note 28, at 40–41. 
 39 ARROW, supra note 34, at 16 (arguing that “collective action can extend the domain of individ-
ual rationality”). 
 40 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968). 
 41 See id. at 1244. For a more contemporary example, “[e]xcessive electrical demand threatening 
to bring down the supply system and black out a metropolitan area is an elegant, all-too-real instance 
of an almost perfectly voluntaristic problem in the creation of a collective bad.” HARDIN, supra note 
28, at 65; see also Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1721, 1722 (2002) (“Asbestos plaintiffs—both present and future—while acting quite rationally, are 
arguably “overgrazing” the accessible financial assets to the detriment of the total value of those as-
sets.”). 
 42 See Hardin, supra note 40, at 1244. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (“Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in 
a world that is limited.”). Perverse results can ensue in any system in which actions reap personal 
rewards when they pay off, but public losses when they backfire. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, 
Fannie, Freddie and You, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/
14krugman.html [https://perma.cc/REK9-N9TP] (stating that “one-way bets can encourage the taking 
of bad risks, because the downside is someone else’s problem”). 
 45 Not all tax-funded causes are equally worthy, and we recognize that coercive means can be 
used to provide citizens not only what they want, but what they supposedly would want if only they 
were more rational. See BERLIN, supra note 33, at 180. For present purposes, though, it is enough to 
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“[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all,”46 then the case for government 
intervention is clear.47 Thus, although the law often intervenes to protect indi-
vidual autonomy against coercion, in other contexts the law overrides individ-
ual choice to achieve important group objectives through coercive mechanisms 
that compel compliance.48 
II. COLLECTIVE COERCION 
This Part contends that there is an overlooked, hybrid category of coer-
cion and collective action.49 Specifically, what we call collective coercion in-
volves an offer made to multiple recipients simultaneously when (1) each re-
cipient’s choice depends to a non-trivial extent on what other recipients decide 
and (2) impediments to collective decision-making prevent the recipients from 
coordinating a response. If both conditions are satisfied, an offer can create a 
problem of collective action that may induce recipients to accept a mediocre 
option for fear of worse consequences. The following sections provide exam-
ples of collective coercion. 
A. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The prisoner’s dilemma is the best known example of a collective-action 
problem that also involves coercion.50 In the usual formulation, two suspects 
have been arrested on suspicion of having committed armed robbery and are 
held in isolation from one another and interrogated. At this point, the police 
lack enough evidence to obtain convictions.51 Without a confession, the state 
                                                                                                                           
show that the state has a role in making collective action possible. Indeed, John Rawls suggests that 
the collective action problem may explain Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s paradoxical insistence in The 
Social Contract that individuals can (and should) be “forced to be free.” See JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES 
ON THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 243 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2007) (“It is clear that Rous-
seau has in mind a case of what today we call free-riding on collectively advantageous schemes of 
cooperation.”). 
 46 Hardin, supra note 40, at 1244. 
 47 For certain goods in common, the institution of private property rights may avoid the problem 
by giving certain individuals a vested interest in the maintenance of the good. Hardin, supra note 40, 
at 1245. 
 48 Although beyond the scope of this Article, there are many other logical and instrumental diffi-
culties to surmount if group choice is to reliably reflect the preferences and values of individual mem-
bers. See generally AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY & FREEDOM (2002) (exploring in great detail the 
related concepts of rationality and freedom). 
 49 See infra notes 50–103 and accompanying text. 
 50 See HARDIN, supra note 28, at 23 (“On the evidence of sheer volume of publications, the most 
interesting of all strategic structures is that of Prisoner’s Dilemma.”). 
 51 Id. at 2. 
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can only prosecute the prisoners for a misdemeanor offense, which would car-
ry a sentence of a year’s imprisonment.52 
In order to obtain confessions from the prisoners, the police make a load-
ed offer along the following lines: 
[Y]ou can turn state’s witness to help us put your partner away for 
ten years, and we’ll let you off free. The only hitch is that, if both of 
you confess, we’ll convict both of you of armed robbery and ask the 
judge for a lenient sentence of only six years for each of you. To 
confess or not to confess—that is your dilemma.53 
Even though the two prisoners are better off remaining silent, each indi-
vidual prisoner’s best strategy is to confess no matter what the other prisoner 
chooses to do.54 The prisoner’s dilemma is a collective-action problem because 
individually rational choice produces a collectively irrational result.55 
To see why individual logic dictates a suboptimal outcome, imagine that 
you are one of the two prisoners. You know that the other prisoner will either 
stay silent or confess. Those are the only two options. If the other prisoner 
stays silent and you confess, you win your freedom. This is the best outcome 
for you and the worst outcome for the other prisoner, who will be imprisoned 
for a decade. The other possibility is that your counterpart will confess. If so, 
you face a decade in prison unless you have also confessed, in which case your 
sentence will be six years. Thus, no matter what the other prisoner does, your 
rational choice is to confess. If both prisoners behave rationally, the optimal 
solution—a year’s imprisonment for each—will be unavailable.56 Maddening-
ly, from your perspective, you will spend an extra five years in prison because 
there is no way to coordinate your response to achieve the best joint out-
come.57 
Although it is usually offered as an example of a collective-action prob-
lem, the prisoner’s dilemma is also a story of coercion. Just as a plea bargain 
offer gives a suspect a loaded choice—take the deal, or else58—the prisoner’s 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 In the language of game theory, “defection is a ‘dominant strategy’ for each player.” Id. at 24. 
 55 Id. at 25. 
 56 From an economic standpoint, “this equilibrium solution is not Pareto-optimal because some 
(indeed all) players could be made better off without making any worse off.” Id. at 28. Instead of 
going to jail for six years, the prisoners could have gone to jail for one year. 
 57 In the real world, it is possible that you would avoid this conundrum. For example, although it 
is a cliché that there is no honor among thieves, you and the other prisoner may come from a commu-
nity with certain shared values and expectations. Also, and perhaps more to the point, you may be 
aware of possible repercussions if you confess and implicate the other prisoner. 
 58 See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent Defendants 
Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 165 (2014) (describing evolution of “plea bargaining 
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dilemma involves a threat of worse consequences for the prisoner who chooses 
to stay silent. That the trigger for some of those consequences depends upon 
the decision of the other prisoner does not make the consequences any less 
real. 
Admittedly, the dilemma the suspects face as a consequence of a cleverly 
designed set of contingent offers is unlikely to elicit much sympathy. After all, 
society wants the police to solve crimes and to bring perpetrators to justice. 
Regardless of whether coercion may be justified in such cases, though, the 
prisoner’s dilemma is significant for this Article’s purposes because it satisfies 
the definition of collective coercion:  the police make a collective offer that 
requires each recipient to consider what other recipients will do and prevents 
the recipients from coordinating a response.59 
B. Tender Offers 
Corporate tender offers have been described as a kind of prisoner’s di-
lemma.60 This section argues that it would be more accurate to say that the 
prisoner’s dilemma and tender offers are both collective-coercion problems. In 
a tender offer, a hostile acquirer announces a proposal to buy a controlling po-
sition in a corporation from its current shareholders, typically at a significant 
premium to the trading price.61 Before Congress first regulated tender offers, 
hostile bidders devised various stratagems to exploit the fact that each individ-
ual stockholder had to consider what other stockholders might do. 
For example, a tender offer could be for something less than all the target 
company’s stock and available only on a first-come, first-served basis. Those 
who waited too long might miss out on the chance to tender stock in exchange 
for the deal premium. Sometimes, the window of opportunity was made quite 
short, as in a so-called “Saturday night special,” in order to increase the pres-
                                                                                                                           
system whereby extremely coercive ‘deals’ were offered to defendants both in terms of incentives to 
forego trial and avoidance of much harsher punishment”). 
 59 To ensure the lack of coordination, the two prisoners are interrogated in different cells and kept 
separated. 
 60 See In re Pure Res. Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 442 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[S]ome view 
tender offers as creating a prisoner’s dilemma—distorting choice and creating incentives for stock-
holders to tender into offers that they believe are inadequate in order to avoid a worse fate.”).  
 61 See Oesterle, supra note 2, at 217 (stating that “tender offers . . . are public announcements that 
a bidder will buy stock tendered to a deposit agent at a set price (or in exchange for the set value of an 
offeror’s securities), usually in excess of the current market price”). A tender offer is only one possi-
ble form of acquisition. For example, an acquirer could negotiate a merger or purchase all the assets of 
the target corporation. Unlike those approaches, a tender offer does not require the participation or 
assent of the target’s management. 
1612 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1599 
sure and preclude a competing offer.62 By regulating many aspects of the ten-
der offer process, the Williams Act curbed the worst of these abuses.63 
Nevertheless, even with significant procedural and substantive protections 
against coercion in place, individual shareholders may still find it difficult to 
rely solely on their own estimate of value in deciding whether the price offered 
is adequate. As one court observed, 
In a tender offer, . . . a non-tendering shareholder individually faces 
an uncertain fate. That stockholder could be one of the few who 
holds out, leaving herself in an even more thinly traded stock with 
little hope of liquidity and subject to a [short-form] merger at a low-
er price or at the same price but at a later (and, given the time value 
of money, a less valuable) time.64 
Thus, before deciding to reject a tender offer, each shareholder must con-
sider the possibility that the takeover will succeed, in which case stragglers 
risk lower consideration in a later back-end merger,65 possibly at a lower val-
uation,66 or else risk being locked in place as minority shareholders with no 
                                                                                                                           
 62 See id. (“[B]idders used short-lived public offers, known as ‘Saturday night specials,’ to buy 
limited amounts of target stock without full disclosure and on a first-come, first-served basis. Such 
offers generated maximum selling pressure on a dispersed and inadequately informed group of share-
holders.”). 
 63 See Hanson Tr. PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the Williams 
Act provides shareholders with information and time to make a reasoned choice); SEC v. Carter Haw-
ley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1985) (observing that “[p]rior to the passage of the 
Act, shareholders of target companies were often forced to act hastily on offers without the benefit of 
full disclosure”); Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Jurispru-
dence Under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S.C. L. REV. 243, 248 (1987) (noting, more generally, 
that “[t]he nature of the federal scheme of securities regulation, borrowed from the English pattern, is 
informational”). 
 64 In re Pure Res. Inc., 808 A.2d at 441–42. 
 65 A back-end (or short-form) merger does not require voting approval of remaining shareholders 
once a controlling shareholder has achieved the requisite percentage of ownership, usually ninety 
percent. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 465 (1977) (noting that Delaware law 
“permits a parent corporation owning at least 90% of the stock of a subsidiary to merge with that 
subsidiary, upon approval by the parent’s board of directors . . . .The statute does not require the con-
sent of, or advance notice to, the minority stockholders.”). Thus, a hostile bidder might use a tender 
offer to achieve control and then, as the controlling shareholder, employ a back-end merger to squeeze 
out the minority shareholders. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling 
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 817–19 (2003). This is sometimes referred to as a two-step 
acquisition. Id. at 818. 
 66 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987) (noting that “[i]f . . . share-
holders believe that a successful tender offer will be followed by a purchase of nontendering shares at 
a depressed price, individual shareholders may tender their shares—even if they doubt the tender offer 
is in the corporation’s best interest”). 
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prospect for a comparable return on the investment.67 In light of these con-
cerns, a rational shareholder might decide to avoid the risk of taking a dissent-
ing position.68 The likelihood of coercion may be even higher when a control-
ling shareholder makes the tender offer as part of a freeze-out transaction be-
cause the corporation’s management no longer provides an effective check 
against overreaching.69 
In other words, a takeover bid is coercive not because of threats made by 
the would-be acquirer but because the takeover bid alters the target corpora-
tion’s shareholders’ baseline for choice. An individual shareholder might agree 
to participate, hoping the takeover bid would fail but not wanting to be left 
behind if it were to succeed. Of course, if other shareholders also act in their 
own self-interest, the takeover is bound to occur even if it is not in the best 
interest of the shareholders collectively.70 Once a takeover bid has been made, 
each shareholder cannot depend upon solidarity with other shareholders and 
must do what is individually rational. 
By contrast, a corporate proposal submitted for ratification by shareholder 
vote is less likely to be coercive because shareholders receive identical treat-
ment regardless of the vote’s outcome—there is no prisoner’s dilemma. For 
example, if the requisite majority approves a merger, all shareholders receive 
the negotiated consideration.71 Consequently, although shareholder voting and 
tendering stock are both mechanisms for registering the preferences of stock-
                                                                                                                           
 67 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeo-
vers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1696 (1985) (positing that “in the face of a takeover bid . . . the share-
holder might tender out of fear that, if he does not tender, the bidder might still gain control, in which 
case the shareholder would be left with low-value minority shares in the acquired target”). 
 68 Indeed, a likely outcome in this sort of scenario is that the corporation’s existing shareholders 
will sell to arbitrageurs (or “arbs” for short) at a discount below the tender price, and those arbs will 
then seek to capture the difference between the price they paid for the stock and the price they hope to 
receive if the tender offer succeeds. See Oesterle, supra note 2, at 205. The arbs take on the risk that a 
tender offer will fail and that they will have paid an above-market price for a minority position in an 
ongoing corporate enterprise. Thus, the intervention of arbs further tilts the playing field in the direc-
tion of the takeover by removing ordinary shareholders with potentially longer investment horizons 
from the process. Although arbs might be open to an even better deal, their principal concern is ensur-
ing that there is a change of control transaction. See id. (“Arbitrageurs must liquidate quickly in order 
to realize a profit on their investments, which are speculative and usually financed with short-term, 
high-interest debt.”). 
 69 See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 31 (2005) (“The ability to freeze 
out the minority at some increment over the market price in a tender offer freezeout, as opposed to 
‘fair value’ in a merger freezeout, introduces the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the control-
ler.”). 
 70 Indeed, each shareholder’s understanding of the logical choice facing all other shareholders 
only reinforces the pressure to participate. 
 71 Depending on the circumstances, the opposing shareholders may have the right to seek judicial 
appraisal of the value of their shares, but they are not required to pursue this remedy and can simply 
accept the same merger consideration as the shareholders who voted in favor of the deal. 
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holders, they should be distinguished. In a recent law review article, one Del-
aware jurist appears to have conflated the two, arguing that “[i]f the first-step 
tender offer in a two-step transaction is conditioned on tenders of a majority of 
the outstanding shares, and if sufficient stockholders tender to satisfy the con-
dition, then it should have the same effect as an affirmative stockholder 
vote.”72 The issue, however, is not just whether shareholders have decided a 
question but whether they have done so in accordance with their own prefer-
ences.73 
Although tender offers resemble the prisoner’s dilemma in certain re-
spects, they demonstrate that collective coercion can arise in a wider range of 
circumstances. For example, an offeror need not have the power to set punish-
ments in order to coerce compliance. Taken as a prototypical case, the prison-
er’s dilemma might seem to suggest that collective coercion exists only in situ-
ations involving overwhelming power disparities and offeror-controlled pay-
outs. Yet, in tender offers coercive pressure can result from the mere fact that 
the offeror has proposed to buy a majority of stock at some premium over the 
market price.74 
Also, unlike the prisoner’s dilemma, collective-coercion problems need 
not involve a dominant strategy whereby each individual’s rational incentive is 
to defect no matter what anyone else does.75 In other words, the problem of 
                                                                                                                           
 72 J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1443, 1459 n.57 (2014). It is true that stockholders cannot seek judicial appraisal without first 
having opposed a transaction, whether by vote or refusal to tender stock. See Peter V. Letsou, The 
Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1998). Yet, it does not follow that 
voting and tendering stock are equivalent mechanisms for supporting a proposed transaction. Unlike 
voting, the tender of stock may not always be voluntary. 
 73 Again, what matters is whether shareholders have the practical ability to say “no.” For exam-
ple, Delaware’s General Corporation Law was amended in 2013 to authorize a two-step merger pro-
cess that does not require a stockholder vote to approve a merger but provides essentially identical 
protections. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2016); 79 Del. Laws ch. 72, § 6 (2013), as amended by 
79 Del. Laws ch. 327, § 7 (2014) and 80 Del. Laws ch. 265, § 7 (2016). The provision only applies to 
tender offers for all shares approved by the target corporation’s board of directors, and it requires that 
the acquirer, if successful in obtaining a majority of stock through the tender process, commit to a 
speedy back-end merger that provides non-tendering shares the “same amount and kind of cash, prop-
erty, rights or securities to be paid” to the tendering shares. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h)(5). 
Shareholders can choose whether to tender with the knowledge that they will be fully protected either 
way. Consequently, “Section 251(h) appears to eliminate the policy bases on which a first-step tender 
offer in a two-step merger may be distinguished from a statutorily required stockholder vote.” See In 
re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 743 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 74 See Subramanian, supra note 69, at 31 (citing In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 
18700, 2001 WL 716787, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001)). 
 75 The prisoner’s dilemma is a stark example of a collective-action problem because each sus-
pect’s dominant strategy is to defect (by confessing) no matter what the other suspect does. The pay-
off is always better. In other coordination problems, defecting may lead to a worse outcome than co-
operation—nevertheless, cooperation does not follow automatically, because the best outcome for an 
individual may be to defect while hoping that others cooperate. 
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collective coercion can be more nuanced than the prisoner’s dilemma scenario 
because each individual’s choice in response to a collective offer is not ration-
ally antagonistic to the choices made by other recipients. When shareholders 
receive a plainly inadequate tender offer, none benefit by accepting it.76 In 
such cases, it may well be that all recipients of an offer would be better off re-
jecting it, individually as well as in the aggregate.77 If so, the problem is one of 
coordination; in the language of game theory, it is an assurance game because 
all players can win by cooperating.78 
C. Disaster Buyouts 
The dynamics that coerce shareholders into participating in corporate 
takeovers can also affect the voluntariness of buyout programs targeting land-
owners. In recent years, voluntary buyouts have emerged as an effective tool 
for reforming land use without the conflict engendered by physical or regulato-
ry takings.79 Buyouts complement policies for protecting coastal areas and can 
be used to remove older, flood-prone properties, thereby creating green space 
to absorb water that might otherwise flood nearby developments.80 Yet, buy-
outs differ from takings in that participation is ostensibly voluntary. Indeed, 
because buyouts are calculated at pre-disaster levels that are often higher than 
the current market value, residents may welcome the opportunity to relocate.81 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Given the variety of investment time horizons, this point cannot be stated categorically at the 
time a tender offer is made. For some shareholders, the opportunity to achieve an immediate return at 
some level above the market price will be more important than whether a higher premium might be 
available in the future. All shareholders, however, benefit ex ante from a system that protects against 
unfairly low tender offers. 
 77 In the prisoner’s dilemma, a prisoner reaps even greater benefits from confessing if the other 
prisoner stays silent. This dynamic, in turn, makes it even less likely that either prisoner will choose 
not to confess. 
 78 See McAdams, supra note 11, at 218–19 (distinguishing prisoner’s dilemma and assurance 
games). 
 79 See, e.g., Matthew Schuerman, Some on Staten Island Opt for Buyout of “Houses That Don’t 
Belong,” NPR (Sept. 19, 2014, 4:13 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/19/349559031/some-on-staten-
island-opt-for-buyout-of-houses-that-dont-belong [https://perma.cc/7M9F-X7KM] (“The idea of buy-
outs, or retreating from flood-prone areas, took root about 20 years ago.”). 
 80 Properties acquired using federal funds must be converted permanently to open space. See 
Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, For Communities Plagued by Repeated Flooding, 
Property Acquisition May Be the Answer (May 28, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/news-release/
2014/05/28/communities-plagued-repeated-flooding-property-acquisition-may-be-answer [https://
perma.cc/3J7M-AW7Z] [hereinafter FEMA Press Release] (“Once purchased by the municipality, the 
homes are demolished and the property is designated as open space.”). 
 81 See id. (“Homes that are determined to be eligible for buyouts are purchased by the town at the 
fair market value of the property prior to the flood.”); see also Franklyn Cater, N.J. Braces for Future 
Disasters by Fleeing, and Fortifying, the Coast, NPR (Sept. 26, 2014, 5:51 PM), http://www.
npr.org/2014/09/26/351737514/n-j-braces-for-future-disasters-by-fleeing-and-fortifying-the 
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The federal government typically provides the lion’s share of funding, pursuant 
to Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) programs created for 
areas subject to repetitive flooding.82 
For example, after Hurricane Sandy ravaged the East Coast, concern re-
garding the possibility of future floods tempered talk of rebuilding. New York 
Governor Andrew Cuomo offered to buyout landowners in flood-prone areas, 
bluntly stating that “[t]here are some parcels that Mother Nature owns. She 
may only visit once every few years. But she owns the parcel and when she 
comes to visit, she visits.”83 New Jersey followed suit and announced a $300 
million buyout program designed to aid homeowners in areas damaged by 
Hurricane Sandy.84 FEMA grants supported both programs.85 
Given the political sensitivity of a policy of relocation and FEMA re-
quirements for funding, the buyout offers were designed to be, or at least ap-
pear, voluntary.86 Consider the careful wording of New Jersey’s official press 
release: 
Governor Chris Christie today announced a plan to use $300 million 
in federal funding that would give homeowners the option of selling 
their properties damaged by Superstorm Sandy in tidal areas of New 
Jersey. The buyout plan involves approximately 1,000 homes im-
pacted by Sandy, in addition to another 300 repetitively flood-
damaged homes located in the Passaic River Basin. The program is 
                                                                                                                           
coast?sc=17&f=1001&utm_source=iosnewsapp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=app [https://
perma.cc/KD6X-UC5D] (discussing one family’s decision to accept buyout after Hurricane Sandy). 
 82 FEMA operates several programs that offer money to “States, Territories, Indian Tribal gov-
ernments, local governments, and eligible private non-profits” for hazard mitigation activities de-
signed “to reduce the risk to individuals and property from natural hazards while simultaneously re-
ducing reliance on Federal disaster funds.” DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY, HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE UNIFIED GUIDANCE: HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT 
PROGRAM, PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION PROGRAM, AND FLOOD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
1 (2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/15463cb34a2267a900bde4774c3f42e4/FINAL_
Guidance_081213_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY3Q-2EPG]. Those programs include funds for repeti-
tive flood claims and severe repetitive loss and cover as much as 90% of the mitigation costs. Id. at 19 
tbl.2. 
 83 Matt Hickman, Cuomo: Don’t Rebuild, Let Mother Nature Take Back Sandy-Damaged Areas, 
MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (Feb. 5, 2013, 6:18 PM) (quoting Governor Cuomo), http://www.mnn.
com/your-home/at-home/blogs/cuomo-dont-rebuild-let-mother-nature-take-back-sandy-damaged-
areas [https://perma.cc/84XZ-FPD9]. 
 84 See State of N.J., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Superstorm Sandy Information, NJ.GOV, http://www.nj.
gov/dep/special/hurricane-sandy/ [https://perma.cc/QV87-7PWS]. 
 85 See FEMA Press Release, supra note 80 (“In the case of Hurricane Sandy, FEMA and the state 
of New Jersey agreed that FEMA will cover one hundred percent of the costs of property acquisition 
as permitted under federal regulations.”). 
 86 See id. (“The program is completely voluntary; no homeowner is required to sell their property 
or is forced to move because their home is located in an area subject to repetitive flooding.”). 
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designed to give homeowners the ability to choose the best option 
for their individual situation.87 
Buyout programs appear voluntary because the state offers a benefit—
money in exchange for property—that the owner is free to accept or reject.88 In 
addition, federal regulations require local public officials to obtain each prop-
erty owner’s signature on an acknowledgment form stating that the local gov-
ernment handling the transaction “has notified the Seller that neither the State 
nor the Local Government will use its eminent domain authority to acquire the 
property for open-space purpose if the Seller chooses not to participate, or if 
negotiations fail.”89 In short, so long as the state does not exercise its power of 
eminent domain and instead simply offers to buy the property, a property own-
er is under no compulsion to accept the buyout. 
Yet, buyout offers can be highly coercive. The structure, if not intent, of 
such offers exploits problems of collective action. Much like individual stock-
holders contemplating a tender offer, each homeowner must take into account 
what other homeowners are likely to do, especially when there is an advantage 
to being first. For example, buyout offers can divide neighbors by making a 
limited pool of resources available.90 If others sell, the holdouts could find 
themselves stuck in a desolate, unsafe neighborhood with drastically reduced 
property values.91 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Press Release, State of N.J., Governor Chris Christie, Governor Christie Announces $300 Mil-
lion Buyout Plan to Give Homeowners the Option to Sell Sandy-Damaged (May 16, 2013), 
http://www.nj.gov/governor/news/news/552013/approved/20130516a.html [https://perma.cc/E693-
9E8U] [hereinafter New Jersey Press Release]. Governor Christie reiterated, “The process is a way to 
help people and property get out of harm’s way, but as I have always said, we will not force any of 
these residents to sell their homes or force any towns to participate in buyouts. This is a willing seller 
program . . . .” Id. 
 88 A buyout initiative in Oakwood Beach, New York, offered “homeowners the pre-storm market 
value for their properties” and “an extra 10 percent, as well as an additional 5 percent to those who 
relocate within the five boroughs.” Kia Gregory, Deciding Whether It’s Lights Out, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/nyregion/deciding-whether-its-lights-out.html?page
wanted=all [https://perma.cc/9VAE-XL6C]. 
 89 Statement of Voluntary Participation for Acquisition of Property for Purpose of Open Space, 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (last updated Apr. 20, 2009), https://
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1630-20490-9770/voluntaray_participation_form_
for_acquisition_of_open_sp ace.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TWX-GY4V]; see DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE ADDENDUM: 
HAZARD MITIGATION GRANT PROGRAM, PRE-DISASTER MITIGATION PROGRAM, AND FLOOD MITI-
GATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 17 (2015), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1424983165449-
38f5dfc69c0bd4ea8a161e8bb7b79553/HMA_Addendum_022715_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/SMK9-
5S3N] [hereinafter GUIDANCE ADDENDUM]. 
 90 See Daniel P. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery: Social Capital in Post-Crisis Resilience, 6 J. HOME-
LAND SEC. 1, 6 (2010). 
 91 See id. 
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In communities with high levels of social capital, individuals are more 
likely to invest in recovery because they believe their neighbors will too.92 
Buyouts send the opposite signal—that the neighbors will not return—and so 
buyout programs could be understood to create a kind of “antisocial capital.” 
When a buyout is commenced in the wake of disaster, its disruptive message 
makes recovery much less likely to occur.93 Although buyout offers may be 
couched in nonthreatening terms, they nevertheless change the baseline for 
choice, leaving those who reject the buyout offer worse off than they would 
have been otherwise.94 Also, just as corporate raiders used time pressure to 
achieve their ends, government buyouts may enforce a tight timetable.95 
Moreover, the government’s commitment never to exercise the power of 
eminent domain can be used to apply coercive pressure.96 Property owners 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility After Disaster, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. 973, 979 (2012); Aldrich, supra note 90, at 7–8. 
 93 See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 88 (noting that many families that initially pledged to return to a 
devastated Staten Island neighborhood after Hurricane Sandy ultimately accepted buyout offers). 
 94 To be clear, identifying coercion in buyout programs says nothing about whether rebuilding 
should occur. Rather, the point is that buyout offers color the social context in which individual choic-
es take place. See id. (“[I]n the aftermath of the storm, it seemed that people in the buyout zone no 
longer belonged.”). 
 95 For instance, one commentator observed that a buyout program implemented in the Wapello 
Levee District along the Iowa River after severe flooding in 1993 succeeded in part because the gov-
ernment provided a very short timeframe for the decision: 
The total buyout time was 16 months from start to finish, which was extremely rapid 
considering the number of agencies involved and the extent of the land. This was in 
some ways expedited because the Corps of Engineers was going to start work on the 
levee soon and if they started, the whole project would be called off, so landowners had 
a short decision time. 
ANNE SIDERS, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, MANAGED COASTAL RE-
TREAT: A LEGAL HANDBOOK ON SHIFTING DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM VULNERABLE AREAS 124 
(2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/
Fellows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf [https://perma.cc/26MY-QKC3]. The prop-
erty owners also lost leverage because the “purchasers of the land used a formulaic approach in setting 
the price to be paid, applying the same formula to all landowners . . . . [which] got rid of the incentive 
for landowners to hold out for a better deal.” Id. In other words, it was a take-it-or-leave-it offer, with 
no room to negotiate. Id. 
 96 The buyout manager for a San Antonio, Texas initiative made sure that property owners under-
stood the consequences of turning down the buyout offer: 
And eventually I guess we also convinced folks there won’t be another buyout out 
there . . . there had been enough notice to the neighbors, to the communities about the 
flooding in these areas that there probably wouldn’t be anyone else interested in buying 
their houses, so if they stayed they’re taking a risk. Number one, there won’t be any 
money a year from now or two years from now to buy your house. Then there might not 
be any buyers because if your house is in a flood plain it’s going to be a negative for 
people coming along later. So some of them understood that ultimately and went ahead 
and sold. We didn’t try to use that as a threat, but that was just kind of to tell them reali-
ty about these kinds of real estate matters. 
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who fail to participate in a buyout cannot hope for the public-law equivalent of 
a back-end merger. Instead, they know that they will be stuck with an essen-
tially unsaleable investment.97 The inherent coerciveness of the property own-
er’s situation is exacerbated by the fact that the counterparty is the state rather 
than a private party, and the property owner will be dependent upon the state to 
continue to provide utilities, fire, and policing, as well as assistance in prepar-
ing for and responding to disasters. Homeowners must apply to the state for 
permission to rebuild in the wake of disaster and delays in that process can 
further damage property values.98 If, contrary to its promises, the government 
does exercise its power of eminent domain sometime after paying other home-
owners for their property, homeowners have reason to suspect that the valua-
tion will be lower.99 For instance, it may be that the property value will be as-
                                                                                                                           
Daniel H. de Vries & James C. Fraser, Citizenship Rights and Voluntary Decision Making in Post-
Disaster U.S. Floodplain Buyout Mitigation Programs, 30 INT’L J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISAS-
TERS 1, 19–20 (2012) (ellipses in original), http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/117341 [https://perma.cc/
VL5R-HLDE]. 
 97 In a laudatory interview published on FEMA’s own website, an emergency manager in Barnes 
County, North Dakota described how she forced homeowners to take less than full value for their 
homes: 
[She] presented the homeowners with a proposal. Although the buyouts were voluntary, 
those who participated would have to give up 15 percent of the final payout on their prop-
erty to cover the local share of the cost. Seven homeowners said yes. Only two said no. 
“They really didn’t have a choice,” [the emergency manager] said. “They couldn’t sell 
their houses because no one would buy them. They couldn’t stand to live in flooding con-
ditions anymore. But they did benefit because they got 85 percent of their house (pre-
disaster value) when most of the houses, where they were, would be worth nothing.” 
FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY & N.D. DIV. OF EMERGENCY MGMT., Waste Not, Want Not: 
Barnes County Makes the Most of Flood-Prone Properties, in JOURNEYS: NORTH DAKOTA’S TRAIL 
TOWARDS DISASTER RESISTANCE 37, 38–39 (2001), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/regions/
regionviii/jurnys.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KR4-7UKH]. To be clear, we do not mean to suggest that the 
deal was unfair to the property owners or that a cash-strapped municipality should have devoted its 
resources to buying out the owners at full value. Rather, the interview simply reflects the reality of the 
situation—that disaster buyouts take place under difficult circumstances and to call them voluntary is, 
at best, a generous fiction. 
 98 That is, buyout managers can pressure homeowners by blocking rebuilding efforts. See de 
Vries & Fraser, supra note 96, at 17 (“Moratoria are temporary holds on building permits; land-use 
applications or other permits; and entitlements related to the use, development, redevelopment, repair, 
and occupancy of private property in the interest of protection of life and property.”). In the wake of 
disaster, “such moratoria are explicitly used to support the prevailing sentiment that it is wise to pre-
vent people from ‘acting quickly’ and replicating inappropriate pre-disaster building patterns.” Id. 
Instead of using the pause to evaluate options in dialogue with the community, some buyout managers 
believe that a moratorium is important to “increase the odds of property owners accepting buyout 
offers for a preconceived mitigation strategy.” Id. 
 99 See Gregory, supra note 88 (noting that some homeowners “worry that if they do not take the 
buyout, the state or the city might eventually take their properties through eminent domain, leaving 
them worse off”). To avoid the promise not to use eminent domain, local public officials might find an 
alternate rationale for condemnation. See de Vries & Fraser, supra note 96, at 18 (“Although not a 
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sessed based on current conditions, including diminished property value, lack 
of basic services, and overall decline of the neighborhood. In light of these 
problems, it should not come as a surprise that more than a third of participants 
in a survey of four buyout programs reported that they felt coerced into accept-
ing the terms of the buyout.100 
By identifying coercive aspects of disaster buyout programs, we do not 
contend that such programs are unjustified. If a community cannot be rebuilt 
safely, public intervention may be warranted to ensure that community solidar-
ity does not reinforce untenable patterns of land use.101 In such situations, 
many members of the community will welcome the opportunity to leave.102 
For those who do not, given the overriding need to shift land use patterns, it 
may be the case that some level of coercion should be accepted as an essential 
aspect of a successful buyout program.103 This Article’s goal at present, 
though, is descriptive; the justifications for coercion cannot be evaluated until 
they have been uncovered. 
                                                                                                                           
common strategy, buyout managers remarked occasionally that properties belonging to holdouts could 
still be acquired through eminent domain, simply by using state funds unrelated to the [federal mitiga-
tion grant].”). Also, even though FEMA’s buyout regulations theoretically prohibit the use of eminent 
domain, “a close approximation of this tool of force” can be achieved via a declaration of substantial 
damage that would make rebuilding ruinously expensive: 
Based on this economic calculation, property owners whose house had been deemed 
substantially damaged were not legally allowed to rebuild unless they could flood-proof 
their home (e.g., elevation) or relocate their house out of the flood plain. Although not 
forcing participation—property owners could still chose to stay under those condi-
tions—the substantially damaged declaration essentially closed off alternative mitiga-
tion options or discussions. 
Id. at 16. The use of substantial damage declarations was influential in the buyout programs studied. 
See id. at 17 (“Where applied, the declaration proved highly effective . . . as only few homeowners 
decided not to participate despite the declaration.”). 
 100 de Vries & Fraser, supra note 96, at 21 (“[A] sizable 35% of the homeowners (108 out of 312) 
across the four buyout programs indicated in the telephone survey that their participation was not 
voluntary.”) 
 101 See RICHARD A. RANOUS, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COOP. RESEARCH PROGRAM, A COM-
PENDIUM OF BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR IMPROVING LOCAL COMMUNITY RECOV-
ERY FROM DISASTROUS HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION INCIDENTS 10 (2012) (noting 
that long-term recovery may involve “rebuilding or relocating damaged or destroyed social, economic, 
natural, and built environments”). 
 102 See Gregory, supra note 88 (“Some in the neighborhood grabbed the offer without hesita-
tion.”). 
 103 Indeed, to the extent shifts in land use are required by natural hazards, some would count 
property owners lucky to receive any compensation from the state. It cannot be the case that landown-
ers have a permanent claim to a disproportionate share of government resources in order to subsidize 
the private benefits of coastal living. 
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III. CHOICE-ENHANCING AND CHOICE-SUBSTITUTING APPROACHES 
This Part argues that a lack of appreciation for the intersections of coer-
cion and collective action can cause considerable confusion as well as create 
avenues for opportunistic exploitation.104 It further contends that judges and 
legislators seeking to provide a remedy for collective coercion must decide 
whether to restore the possibility of autonomous individual choice or to identi-
fy and empower a centralized decision maker.105 In other words, should the 
problem be characterized as coercion or collective action? Although both ap-
proaches may be plausible in a given circumstance, this Part identifies factors 
that can help to guide the analysis.106 
A. Defining the Objective 
Collective coercion involves aspects of two well-understood problems: 
collective action and coercion. Perhaps because of this overlap, lawmakers 
have sometimes aimed at the wrong target. For example, lawmakers may dis-
play solicitude for individual choice when the collective context of an offer has 
already fatally undermined that choice, or they may propose to resolve a prob-
lem of coercion when the real issue is collective action. At best, this lack of 
clarity creates uncertainty. At worst, it can undermine the effectiveness of 
well-intentioned legal measures and leave room for opportunistic actors to 
change the law to suit their own purposes. 
1. Coercion-Enhancing Regulation 
Laws that seek to prevent coercion by focusing on individual choice may 
fail to identify the mechanisms that facilitate collective coercion. A law that 
misdiagnoses the problem it is designed to address is unlikely to be effective. 
Moreover, the law may insist upon supposed protections that only make mat-
ters worse. 
For example, although the federal government conditions its participation 
in the purchase of flood-endangered properties on the voluntariness of the 
transactions, the federal government mandates a process that all but guarantees 
that homeowners will feel coercive pressure to participate in a buyout pro-
gram. Specifically, each eligible homeowner must be told that no eminent do-
main proceeding will ever be launched if the homeowner declines to partici-
                                                                                                                           
 104 See infra notes 107–171 and accompanying text. 
 105 Cf. YOGI BERRA & DAVE KAPLAN, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT!: 
INSPIRATION AND WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL’S GREATEST HEROES 2–5 (2001) (discussing 
the difficulty of choosing between two good options in a given situation). 
 106 In some instances, a mixed strategy may be appropriate even though there will be inevitable 
tension between remedies that bolster individual choice and those that supplant it. 
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pate in the buyout, and the homeowner must sign a written acknowledgement 
to the same effect.107 
Yet, as discussed above, the unequivocal statement that there will not be a 
regulatory taking increases coercive pressure on homeowners because they 
worry about the consequences of declining a buyout if their neighbors choose 
to accept it.108 Put differently, the source of the coercive pressure is not the 
terms of the individual offer but the context in which it is made. If the only 
issue were individual choice, the federal government’s regulations would be 
appropriate. Homeowners, however, are concerned instead about changes to 
the value of their property resulting from other homeowners’ decisions.109 On-
ly by reassuring the homeowner against that indirect threat can the state restore 
a modicum of voluntariness to the process. 
In that regard, instead of promising not to use the power of eminent do-
main, non-coercive buyout offers might contain a guarantee that the power of 
eminent domain will be used to acquire all properties within the buyout plan if 
the plan achieves a specified threshold level of overall participation. The buy-
out offers might also promise that the value of the property for purposes of 
eminent domain valuation will be identical to the appraised value for the buy-
out offer. By providing an exit strategy, the government would make it easier 
for homeowners to decide whether to take the buyout offer without hedging 
against their neighbors’ choices. 
Notably, an approach to the formulation of buyout offers that included the 
later use of eminent domain would be consistent with state law that defines 
structurally non-coercive tender offers as those that promise a back-end merger 
at the same price as the tender offer.110 Including a mandatory back-end exit 
conditioned upon a high overall level of voluntary participation would reduce 
the coercion of the initial offer because there would be no reason to worry 
about being left out of what could be the last opportunity to achieve a reasona-
ble return on the property investment.111 
Also, by setting a target for participation, a threshold requirement could 
spur greater community coordination and perhaps encourage collective choices 
                                                                                                                           
 107 See GUIDANCE ADDENDUM, supra note 89, at 17. 
 108 See supra notes 78–102 and accompanying text; see also Gregory, supra note 88 (interviewing 
homeowners worried about the aftermath of a government buyout and feeling pressure to move). 
 109 See Kuo & Means, supra note 92, at 989 (discussing the importance of social capital in disas-
ter recovery). 
 110 Air Prod. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, 16 A.3d 48, 106–07 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 111 The most significant difference might be the timetable for getting paid. Those who accept the 
buyout would receive their funds upfront whereas the properties subject to eminent domain would go 
through a different legal process. 
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regarding relocation.112 Democratic participation involving neighborhood as-
sociations, city councils, and state environmental agencies could help vulnera-
ble communities to advocate on behalf of their constituents.113 Finally, making 
buyouts conditional on robust participation could save the federal government 
money when participation levels are low, because a gap-toothed pattern of 
property acquisitions might not achieve broader cost-saving goals. 
Nor does the requirement that property owners sign a statement of volun-
tary participation remove coercive pressures or guarantee that their participa-
tion is truly voluntary. If a homeowner feels no choice but to go along with a 
buyout, it is hard to see how signing a piece of paper will make a difference. 
Arguably, the requirement only reinforces the power of the state by forcing the 
homeowner to affirm that the transaction is voluntary, whatever the homeown-
er might really feel.114 The problem of collective coercion is not one of total 
compulsion or naked threat—if it were, the need for a written acknowledgment 
might be useful in identifying quasi-hostage situations—but inheres instead in 
the simple fact that a rational homeowner must consider whether the decisions 
of other homeowners will create potentially adverse consequences. 
In sum, the current approach to ensuring that disaster buyouts are volun-
tary is almost the opposite of what would be effective and fair if the goal were 
to make disaster buyouts non-coercive. Stripped of the guise of fully voluntary 
participation, disaster buyouts are in large part an exercise of the power of the 
state and should be evaluated as such. Perhaps, rather than seeking to make 
disaster buyouts more voluntary, the question instead should be whether the 
payments made to individual landowners are consistent with the demands of 
social justice. 
                                                                                                                           
 112 On the other hand, there could be a danger of intimidation among neighbors that would need 
to be monitored. 
 113 See de Vries & Fraser, supra note 96, at 3 (“A true voluntary mitigation program is a process 
in which a population—including marginal groups—meets with authorities to share, negotiate and 
control decisions in the development of a project affecting their livelihood and in its subsequent im-
plementation.”). Notably, the law regulating buyouts already envisions a scheme of cooperative feder-
alism and so giving greater voice to local communities would be consistent with existing law. Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 
461 (2012) (defining cooperative federalism as a process by which “states are charged by Congress 
with administering federal law”). According to one commentator, cooperative federalism should be 
understood to include “all federal schemes that furnish a role for the states.” Id. at 461–62 n.8. Obtain-
ing a rough consensus for a buyout plan would reduce the likelihood of scenarios in which many resi-
dents oppose a buyout but feel that they have little choice but to sell. 
 114 As anyone who has witnessed a plea bargain can attest, the awesome power of the state is 
rarely more evident than when a person dressed in a prison jumpsuit agrees to knowingly and volun-
tarily waive rights before sentencing. 
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2. Substantive Coercion 
Sometimes, courts and lawmakers appear to confuse problems of coercion 
with problems of collective action. In Delaware, for example, there has been 
considerable confusion regarding the proper role of the board in responding to 
hostile takeovers because courts use the language of coercion to include prob-
lems of collective action. 
As an initial matter, Delaware courts refuse to give boards carte blanche 
authority to shut down hostile takeover bids because board members have a 
vested interest in the perquisites of board membership.115 In light of the “om-
nipresent specter of entrenchment,” courts undertake a searching proportionali-
ty review that asks whether the board has identified a “legitimate threat” and 
whether its response is proportionate to the threat.116 
A coercive takeover bid clearly counts as a legitimate threat and warrants 
a board response. For example, Delaware courts recognize “the threat of coer-
cion that results from a two-tier offer promising unequal treatment for nonten-
dering shareholders.”117 As the Delaware Supreme Court has explained, “In 
such a case, the threat is obvious: shareholders may be compelled to tender to 
avoid being treated adversely in the second stage of the transaction.”118 This 
kind of coercion is sometimes labeled “structural coercion,” and the board’s 
role in addressing it should be relatively uncontroversial. 
Yet, the concept of coercion has been stretched to include tender offers 
that are not coercive in any ordinary sense of the word. In particular, Dela-
ware’s Supreme Court accepts “substantive coercion” as a legitimate threat—
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (stating that “officers and 
directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private inter-
ests” (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939))). Ordinarily, the business judgment 
rule limits judicial review of board decisions. See id. (“The rule posits a powerful presumption in 
favor of actions taken by the directors in that a decision made by a loyal and informed board will not 
be overturned by the courts unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’” (quoting 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))). 
 116 Air Prod. & Chems. Inc, 16 A.3d at 91–93 (stating that due to the threat of a board acting in its 
own interests “there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before 
the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred” (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985))). 
 117 Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989); see also Ronald J. Gil-
son & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Sub-
stance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 258 (1989) (noting consensus that unequal 
treatment for non-tendering shareholders justifies defensive action by corporate officers). 
 118 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152; see also Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 956 (holding that two-tier 
“offers are a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into tendering at the first 
tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will receive at the back end of the transac-
tion”); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 297, 337 (1974) (“[T]he presence of an announced differential is plainly coer-
cive.”). 
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the danger that shareholders might make the wrong decision and tender their 
shares out of “ignorance or a mistaken belief.”119 Baffled lower courts have 
sometimes treated the concept of substantive coercion as an absurdity and have 
been inclined to interpret it narrowly. As one court stated, the “law should . . . 
hesitate to ascribe rube-like qualities to stockholders. If stockholders are pre-
sumed competent to buy stock in the first place, why are they not presumed 
competent to decide when to sell in a tender offer after an adequate time for 
deliberation has been afforded them?”120 
However, Delaware’s recognition of substantive coercion as grounds for 
board intervention becomes clearer once it is recognized that Delaware courts 
view boards of directors as the solution to a broader problem of collective ac-
tion. Thus, properly understood, the issue is not so much whether shareholders 
have been threatened but whether the board is in a superior position to act on 
their behalf: 
Even in a competitive acquisitions market, disaggregated sharehold-
ers may require a bargaining agent to obtain top dollar for target as-
sets. Without a coordinated response from shareholders, any offer 
can succeed that exceeds the expected value of the firm in the hands 
of existing management or other competing bidders. By contrast, 
target managers who have the power to preclude hostile offers by 
deploying defensive tactics may be able to compel acquirers to pay 
out the bulk of their transaction gains.121 
In 2011, in Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., the Delaware 
Chancery Court upheld management’s decision to block a tender offer that was 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153 (holding that board’s decision to resist takeover was appropriate 
in light of conclusion that shareholders might agree to tender their stock “in ignorance or a mistaken 
belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might produce”); see Unitrin, 
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) (reaffirming holding in Paramount that 
Time’s board of directors “was also reasonably concerned that the Time stockholders might tender to 
Paramount in ignorance or based upon a mistaken belief, i.e., yield to substantive coercion”). Profes-
sors Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman first proposed the concept of substantive coercion and 
cautioned that “[f]rom the perspective of shareholders, substantive coercion is possible only if man-
agement plausibly expects to better the terms of a hostile offer—whether by bargaining with the offe-
ror, by securing a competitive bid, or by managing the company better than the market expects.” Gil-
son & Kraakman, supra note 117, at 268. 
 120 Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 121 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 117, at 261. Also, “defensive tactics might . . . benefit target 
shareholders by providing time for managers to ‘shop’ the firm. In this case, managers who assert that 
an offer is too low must claim private knowledge about either the acquisition market or the value of 
the firm.” Id. Finally, and most controversially, management might assert substantive coercion based 
on its view that the firm is underpriced because it does not account for management’s own plan to 
produce value. Id. at 262. 
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allegedly inadequate even though there was no hint of structural coercion.122 
The court stated that Air Products’ offer was not structurally coercive because 
even stockholders who refused to tender on the front end could receive equal 
consideration on the back end.123 Despite misgivings about management’s 
claim of substantive coercion,124 the court felt that it was bound to follow 
precedent that “directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to 
determine that the market undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders 
from offers that do not reflect the long-term value of the corporation under its 
present management plan.”125 
Framed solely in terms of the risk of shareholder coercion, Delaware’s 
deference to management does not make sense. By allowing boards to block 
well-informed shareholders from making their own choices, Delaware law 
thwarts shareholder autonomy.126 A more plausible explanation, however, is 
that Delaware has mischaracterized its approach to what it perceives as a col-
lective-action problem. To the extent Delaware has chosen to limit shareholder 
choice in favor of board decision-making even when a proposed takeover in-
volves no coercion, that policy choice should be acknowledged more directly 
so that its wisdom can be evaluated.127 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Air Prod. & Chems. Inc, 16 A.3d at 106, 129. 
 123 Id. at 106–07. 
 124 Management’s principal argument in favor of its position was that a majority of the target 
corporation’s stock had been acquired by arbitrageurs who stood to profit if the tender offer were 
successful and disregarded the possible long-term value of the corporation. Id. at 108. These arbitra-
geurs would, according to management, coerce the minority shareholders by causing the tender offer 
to succeed, at which point the minority shareholders would be forced to exchange their stock for inad-
equate consideration. Id. at 109 (“The argument is premised on the fact that a large percentage (almost 
half) of Airgas’s stockholders are merger arbitrageurs . . . who would be willing to tender into an 
inadequate offer because they stand to make a significant return on their investment even if the offer 
grossly undervalues Airgas . . . .”). The flaw in this argument, as the court observed, is that “defend-
ants do not appear to have come to grips with the fact that the arbs bought their shares from long-term 
stockholders who viewed the increased market price generated by Air Products’ offer as a good time 
to sell.” Id. However, “Air Products’ own expert testified that a large number—if not all—of the arbi-
trageurs who bought into Airgas’s stock at prices significantly below the $70 offer price would be 
happy to tender their shares at that price regardless of the potential long-term value of the company.” 
Id. at 111. 
 125 Id. at 112 (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1376) (internal quotation marks and additional cita-
tions omitted). 
 126 As a practical matter, a corporation with a staggered board can take defensive measures to 
block a tender offer and force a would-be acquirer to either negotiate terms with the board or desist. 
See id. A determined bidder would have to use the proxy-solicitation process to replace the target 
corporation’s board, and obtaining a majority position on a staggered board could take two years or 
more even if successful. Few bidders can afford to wait so long. 
 127 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 117, at 265 (“For the game to be worth the candle, courts 
applying the proportionality test must be able to improve on the market’s efforts to distinguish when 
management is right and when it is wrong.”). 
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3. Opportunism 
In situations that involve both coercion and collective action, a motivated 
party may seek to obscure one of the two issues at stake. For example, in Frie-
drichs v. California Teachers Ass’n,128 decided by the Supreme Court in 2016, 
the plaintiffs were California teachers who objected to paying non-membership 
fees to support the collective bargaining activities of a union that represents the 
interests of all California teachers.129 After oral argument but before the case 
could be decided, Justice Scalia died, and the Court ultimately affirmed the 
lower court’s ruling per curiam by a divided 4-4 vote.130 
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy, who has often provided the swing 
vote in politically charged cases, appeared sympathetic to plaintiffs’ argument 
and suggested that, far from being free riders, they were “compelled riders” 
who had been coerced into supporting expression that they opposed.131 Justice 
Kennedy’s terminology implies a binary distinction between coercion and col-
lective action such that one might attend to the needs of compelled riders with-
out, at the same time, creating free riders. If interest alignment were sufficient 
to avoid problems of collective action, however, the tragedy of the commons 
would just be speculative fiction. 
In fact, addressing large-scale problems of collective action typically re-
quires coercion of individuals. In this context, without the ability to collect 
mandatory fees, the union’s ability to raise funds for its activities would be 
hindered by a collective-action problem. To that end, existing law concerning 
public-sector unions endorses a compromise between competing concerns that 
allows employees to pay an agency fee that applies only to certain union ac-
tivities, such as wage and hour negotiations that do not involve political advo-
cacy.132 
We have no reason to believe that the named plaintiffs were insincere in 
their personal objection to any involvement with the teachers’ union, but it 
                                                                                                                           
 128 136 S. Ct 1083 (2016) (per curiam). 
 129 Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Friedrichs v. Cali. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (No. 
14-915), 2015 WL 5261564, at *1. Petitioners argued that a scheme whereby “a state compels its 
public-school teachers to subsidize a particular viewpoint on political issues . . . . cannot satisfy exact-
ing scrutiny (or, indeed, any level of First Amendment review).” Id. at 10–11. 
 130 Friedrichs, 136 S. Ct. at 1083. 
 131 Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Friedrichs v. Cali. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) 
(No. 14-915), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/friedrichs-v-california-teachers-association/ 
[https://perma.cc/9CR4-353Z]. 
 132 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–36 (1977). The petitioners sought to 
overrule Abood and argued that there is effectively no such thing as non-political union activity. See 
Amy Howe, Union Fees in Jeopardy: In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:08 pm), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/union-fees-in-jeopardy-in-plain-english/ [https://perma.cc/7R6F-
BF6L]. 
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seems evident that the litigation was designed to inflict damage on public-
sector unions, restricting their ability to achieve their objectives by hobbling 
them with a severe collective-action problem. At least until a new Justice is 
appointed to the Court, the legal status of non-membership fees will remain 
uncertain.133 At bottom, the question is whether to preserve an existing tradeoff 
between the First Amendment interests of individual employees and the collec-
tive-action problems that bedevil public-sector unions whose activities benefit 
all employees regardless of whether they contribute. If the Court wishes to re-
visit the compromise position it endorsed almost forty years ago, it should 
begin by acknowledging that coercion and collective action are interrelated 
phenomena. 
B. Picking a Path 
Collective coercion presents a choice between protecting individual au-
tonomy and overriding it, and lawmakers need a reasoned basis for deciding 
which path to follow. This section argues that lawmakers should consider the 
nature of the values at stake—in particular, whether there is a single, agreed-
upon objective and whether the choice implicates matters central to individual 
dignity and autonomy.134 This section also argues that lawmakers should ask 
whether it is feasible to create a market to price the matter at issue.135 These 
are related inquiries because the availability of a market solution will depend 
on the nature of the values at stake. In addition, a market analysis should take 
into account relevant externalities; if the recipients of an offer do not internal-
ize important benefits or costs, there will be less reason to defer to their indi-
vidual preferences. 
1. Values 
To inquire into the values at stake in a case of collective coercion is to ask 
how much individual autonomy should matter. The more idiosyncratic and 
personal the issue, the more important it becomes to ensure that each affected 
individual has the freedom to make an uncoerced choice. By contrast, if what 
is at issue is how best to maximize some uncontroversial collective good, then 
selecting a decision maker becomes more of an empirical question: will indi-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Supreme Court News: Supreme Court Deadlocks 4–4 on Agency Fees, UNION CONT. L. 
BULL., (Quinlan Publ’g Grp., Bos., Mass.), May 2016 (“The National Right to Work Foundation said 
that it is litigating five other cases to eliminate requirements that nonmembers pay fees to unions. The 
Center for Individual Rights said that it would seek rehearing of the case after the Supreme Court once 
again has nine justices.”). 
 134 See infra notes 136–145 and accompanying text. 
 135 See infra notes 146–171 and accompanying text. 
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viduals do a better job of protecting their own interests or is a centralized, sub-
stitute decision maker well suited to help the members of a group achieve their 
joint objectives? 
Plotted along a continuum, disaster buyouts appear closer to the paradig-
matic case for individual choice whereas corporate tender offers seem to pre-
sent a stronger case for a substituted decision maker. In other words, the issue 
of coercion seems more salient in the former case, and the difficulties of col-
lective action seem more salient in the latter. 
a. Buyouts 
 In disaster buyouts, multiple values are likely to be implicated. Although 
some homeowners will view their property solely in economic terms as an in-
vestment, others are likely to have significant emotional attachments to the 
property, especially if it is used as their primary residence. In some cases, land 
may have been in the same family for generations and may be worth far more 
to that family than it would be to a neutral appraiser. 
Given the strong and idiosyncratic values associated with home owner-
ship, the response to a disaster buyout initiative seems necessarily to turn on 
individual choices that cannot easily be aggregated. For this reason, to the ex-
tent possible, it would seem preferable to respond to collective coercion by 
bolstering individual autonomy rather than by finding a sympathetic decision 
maker to solve the problem of collective action on behalf of all homeowners. 
In addition, one could argue that it is not necessary for all homeowners to 
reach the same conclusion. Rather, each piece of property acquired for conver-
sion to green space advances the goal of coastal protection by absorbing flood 
waters and by removing vulnerable property from harm’s way. Thus, a few 
holdouts will not defeat the purpose of a buyout program.136 By contrast, when 
the state seeks easements from property owners to protect sand dunes along a 
beachfront, even a single gap can render the entire program unworkable.137 
                                                                                                                           
 136 On the other hand, as noted previously, a guaranteed back-end eminent domain proceeding 
would reduce the coerciveness of the offer. Perhaps a compromise position would give homeowners a 
continuing right to initiate a buyout proceeding for an extended but not indefinite period of time. 
 137 In New Jersey, efforts along these lines in the wake of Superstorm Sandy have been conten-
tious. See Tracey Samuelson, Long Beach Posts Names of N.J. Shore Holdouts on Dune Easements, 
NEWSWORKS (May 7, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/new-jersey/54476-long-
beach-township-posts-names-of-dune-easement-holdouts [https://perma.cc/5G6B-L9RJ]. 
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b. Tender Offers 
 For most shareholders, the value of a stock position in a public corpora-
tion is purely economic.138 Shareholders do not ordinarily form emotional at-
tachments to their equity position in a corporation.139 Rather, they should be 
indifferent to company-specific risk and interested solely in maximizing the 
value of their investment. Although shareholders may have different time hori-
zons for investment and it is sometimes said that there is pressure for managers 
to seek short-term gains over longer-term performance, these differences in 
perspective can be overstated as the current market price for stock is nothing 
more than the market’s estimate of future earnings discounted to present value. 
In any case, regardless of time horizon, all investors share the goal of making 
money. 
When shareholders invest in a corporation, they know that the board of 
directors has almost exclusive managerial authority.140 Shareholders have very 
little voice in the management of corporate affairs.141 Although they vote for 
directors and can sue derivatively on behalf of the corporation under limited 
circumstances, shareholders ordinarily express their disagreement with corpo-
rate policy by selling their stock.142 Only in certain transactions involving the 
sale or restructuring of the corporation can shareholders dissent and demand 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 
413 (2006) (“Shareholders invest in corporations primarily for economic gain.”). In some cases, indi-
viduals with a social agenda have purchased stock in order to seek access to the corporation’s proxy 
machinery. See State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406, 408–09 (1971) (denying 
shareholder’s request for corporate records in furtherance of plan to alert other shareholders to corpo-
ration’s manufacture of fragmentation land mines). The courts’ response to activist shareholders has 
reaffirmed the central purpose for investing: making money. See id. at 411 (holding that a stockholder 
is only permitted to inspect a company’s stockholder ledger if she has a “proper purpose germane to 
[her] economic interest as a shareholder”). 
 139 The situation is very different in closely held, family-owned businesses. See Benjamin Means, 
Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1190–91 (2013) (observing 
that “business ownership can provide nonmonetary benefits to family members such as stable em-
ployment, status in the community, and agreeable working conditions”). In that context, though, hos-
tile tender offers are practically unheard of. For one thing, the managers of the corporation are likely 
to be the shareholders themselves. Also, most closely held businesses put share-transfer restrictions in 
place that would prevent minority shareholders from selling to an unrelated third party without the 
permission of the other shareholders. 
 140 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR FOUND. 2003) (“All corporate powers shall 
be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by 
or under the direction of, its board of directors . . . .”). 
 141 See George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100 VA. 
L. REV. 261, 262 (2014) (“Shareholders are the residual owners of a company, but they do not collec-
tively vote on every firm decision. Rather, they cede power to a small group of representatives who 
are entrusted to call most of the shots.”). 
 142 See id. 
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that their shares be appraised for fair value.143 In appraisal proceedings, the 
sole question is the economic value of the stock. 
Accordingly, there is reason to believe that shareholders would prefer the 
approach to regulating tender offers best calculated to maximize the economic 
return on their investment. Whether that means giving shareholders greater 
flexibility to tender their stock or allowing boards of directors to intervene may 
be debatable,144 but it is not a question of leaving space for the idiosyncratic 
expression of shareholder values.145 
2. Markets 
Markets offer another perspective on the problem of collective coercion. 
To the extent it is possible to structure a well-functioning market in which in-
dividuals can make informed, voluntary decisions and assuming that the matter 
at issue can be priced,146 then the appropriate role for law is to regulate the 
market. For example, we might investigate whether it would ameliorate coer-
cion if market participants were given more time and information to make a 
decision or if barriers to entry were lowered to enable competing bids and so 
on. If, however, a market solution is not suitable because of intractable differ-
ences in power, information, or timing or because there are external costs and 
benefits for society that the market will ignore, then a more centralized deci-
sion-making mechanism may be preferable. 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine 
Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 614 (1998) (“Every state corporate statute contains at least some form 
of appraisal remedy, yet the proper role the appraisal remedy should play in corporate law remains 
elusive.” (citation omitted)). 
 144 See, e.g., Kevin W. Barrett, Note, Federal Limitations on Target Defensive Tactics: Applying 
Edgar v. Mite Corp. to the “Private Conduct” of Target Directors, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1187, 1191 
(1986) (“Takeover attempts implicate a fundamental issue of corporate governance—the distribution 
of power between the owners and managers of corporations. By allowing shareholders to oust corpo-
rate management through extra-corporate procedures, tender offers represent shareholders’ most ef-
fective method of combating ineffective management. Target defensive tactics, however, often enable 
incumbent management to prevent the shareholders from considering a takeover bid altogether. Thus, 
the rules governing target defensive tactics play a critical role in regulating takeovers.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 145 Given the power of the board and the possibility that the board will not maximize value for 
shareholders but will instead entrench itself, tender offers may provide a valuable alternative. For this 
reason, courts and legislators hesitate to disable the mechanism and the market for corporate control 
entirely. Delaware’s proportional review represents one influential approach to addressing these com-
peting concerns. See supra notes 115–127 and accompanying text. 
 146 Whether something should be traded on a market may include normative issues of commodifi-
cation. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 
6 (2012) (“Today, the logic of buying and selling no longer applies to material goods alone but in-
creasingly governs the whole of life. It is time to ask whether we want to live this way.”). 
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As applied to disaster buyouts and tender offers, a market-oriented analy-
sis suggests a different answer to the problem of collective coercion than the 
values analysis in the preceding section.147 In the case of disaster buyouts, it 
turns out that it is very difficult to create a true market and there are large ex-
ternalities involved. By contrast, there is no reason in principle to believe that a 
robust market for corporate control cannot be created, though the centralized 
power of the board of directors might in some circumstances allow for greater 
bargaining leverage than shareholders could achieve on their own. 
a. Buyouts 
 An initial difficulty in creating a market for disaster buyouts is that the 
government is the sole player on the buyer side of the equation.148 Compound-
ing that problem, the government has an inescapable and pervasive role in de-
fining and protecting the property rights that would be purchased. For exam-
ple, property owners must comply with insurance requirements, building 
codes, and myriad other zoning rules that affect the cost of ownership and the 
extent of development rights.149 These regulations will, of course, impact the 
economic value of the property at issue.150 
Also, to the extent homeowners rely upon public protection, enjoying the 
private benefits of coastal living while socializing some of the costs, their use 
of property involves externalities that a market transaction would fail to cap-
ture. Therefore, without significant public intervention, unsafe, ecologically 
untenable development will go uncorrected.151 Market signals are unlikely to 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See supra notes 136–144 and accompanying text. 
 148 By contrast, if a corporation receives a takeover offer that management believes is too low, 
management can seek to find another bidder who would be willing to pay more. Indeed, it would often 
violate the fiduciary obligations of management for them to pursue an acquisition with one buyer 
without testing the market. 
 149 If the government were to substantially change the permitted uses for property, violating set-
tled expectations, a property owner might bring a takings claim for compensation. See Christopher 
Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 
350 (2014). 
 150 Because the government plays a large role in establishing the baseline for individual choice, it 
will be very difficult to ascertain whether a government buyout offer has affected the baseline for 
choice in a manner that should be considered coercive. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 918–19 (1987) (arguing that existing analyses of the baseline for state action 
have not adequately appreciated “whether there is a constitutional requirement of neutrality that com-
mands preservation of the status quo as reflected in market outcomes, or instead whether the Constitu-
tion, recognizing the artifactual quality of the market allocation, permits and sometimes demands 
change”). 
 151 Notably, “on average, the 11 coastline counties that were hit by 11 or more hurricanes between 
1960 and 2008 increased in population by nearly 179 percent and had a housing unit increase of 255 
percent.” STEVEN G. WILSON & THOMAS R. FISCHETTI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COASTLINE POPULA-
TION TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1960 TO 2008, at 20 (2010), http://www.census.gov/prod/2010
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help, because, notwithstanding the risk of disaster, “[s]ocial, economic, and 
environmental factors continue to draw residents to coastline destinations.”152 
Rather than retreat from the risk of disastrous flooding, landowners may 
seek to protect their investment with revetments, seawalls, bulwarks, dredged 
sand, and other forms of coastal armoring, regardless of the longer-term con-
sequences.153 In this regard, there is a problem of incentives: much of the cost 
of coastal protection and disaster response is effectively socialized.154 Moreo-
ver, as a matter of basic moral and political obligation, society cannot ignore 
the plight of communities once they are affected by disaster; accordingly, those 
who live in vulnerable areas have reason to expect that the costs of disaster 
will be borne in part by taxpayers.155 
                                                                                                                           
pubs/p25-1139.pdf [https://perma.cc/E35B-VXB9]. Thus, even repeated, serious disasters have not 
been enough to discourage development. 
 152 ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-
KATRINA WORLD 28 (2010) (observing that people may choose to live near volcanoes or in flood-
plains because of the rich soil and other benefits: “There is always flood and pestilence, too, but for 
millennia the bargain has seemed worth it. That might be changing.”); WILSON & FISCHETTI, supra 
note 151, at 22.. 
 153 Coastal armoring endangers beaches that otherwise would drift inland. Instead, the sea scours 
everything behind the seawall, eventually eliminating the beach altogether. For a recent exception, see 
Jess Bidgood, At a Cape Cod Landmark, a Strategic Retreat from the Ocean, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/07/us/at-a-cape-cod-landmark-a-strategic-retreat-from-the-
ocean.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news [https://perma.cc/32DC-JHPS] (“‘We’re re-
treating,’ said George E. Price Jr., the superintendent of the Cape Cod National Seashore, which is run 
by the National Park Service. Other facilities at the beach have already been rebuilt farther back from 
the water.”). 
 154 For instance, Reuters reports that a prominent politician was able to circumvent zoning re-
strictions in order to construct a beachfront vacation home in an area subject to significant erosion; 
then, given the value of his house and others along the same strand, the government’s cost-benefit 
analysis supported the expenditure of millions of dollars to artificially pump sand onto the beach, a 
temporary solution at best. Deborah J. Nelson et al., Against the Tide: Why Americans Are Flocking to 
Their Sinking Shores Even as the Risks Mount in WATER’S EDGE: THE CRISIS OF RISING SEA LEVELS, 
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/waters-edge-the-crisis-
of-rising-sea-levels/#article-2-against-the-tide [https://perma.cc/ZA2D-SVQE]; see also Sammy 
Fretwell, Resort’s Troubles Threaten to Erode SC Beach Law, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.) (Mar. 28, 
2014, 9:12 PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article13844657.html [https://
perma.cc/9K29-CLB8] (describing lobbying efforts of wealthy homeowners). 
 155 Unfortunately, society’s commitment to provide aid seems strongest when those affected by 
disaster are already privileged. See VERCHICK, supra note 152, at 107 (“Across time and across bor-
ders, naturally triggered disasters are nearly always accompanied by patterns of unfair social distribu-
tion.”); see also Susan S. Kuo, Disaster Tradeoffs: The Doubtful Case for Public Necessity, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 127, 181 (2013) (observing that there were proposals to protect Manhattan at the expense of less 
affluent boroughs in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy). Nevertheless, the broader point holds true, 
especially because those who are privileged are more likely to have had a choice about where to live 
in the first place. Moreover, the nation’s horrified reaction to Hurricane Katrina suggests that leaving 
people to their fate is not considered an acceptable response to disaster. But see VERCHICK, supra note 
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Nor has the national flood insurance program succeeded in aligning local 
and national interests.156 The policy rationale seemed inspired: the federal gov-
ernment would supply flood insurance at affordable rates no longer available 
from private insurers;157 in exchange, individuals and communities would be 
required to undertake a variety of disaster mitigation steps.158 By exceeding the 
minimum requirements, communities could lower the cost of their insur-
ance.159 Yet, although well intentioned, the mitigation requirements have not 
been met in many cases.160 Also, because the insurance program is not actuari-
ally sound—indeed, it exists precisely because no private insurer would cover 
the relevant risks—the principal effect seems to have been an increase in the 
moral hazard that arises when an individual can keep the benefits while out-
sourcing some of the costs of his or her activity.161 
Thus, because the government is so pervasively involved in protecting 
coastal property and, in some cases, insuring it against loss, it is hard to imag-
ine how disaster buyouts could be better assimilated to a market model. Also, 
because coastal land use creates externalities for society, some level of coer-
cion may be appropriate. If, however, the goal of achieving sensible land use 
                                                                                                                           
152, at 151 (noting that some prominent commentators have argued that the federal government 
should have no role in disaster response). 
 156 See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4131 (2012)). 
 157 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (“[M]any factors have made it uneconomic for the private insurance 
industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need . . . but [] a program of flood insur-
ance with large-scale participation of the Federal Government . . . is feasible and can be initiated.”); 
MARK S. DORFMAN & DAVID A. CATHER, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE 43 
(10th ed. 2012) (stating that insurers have difficulty calculating risks for extreme and undiversifiable 
events such as floods). 
 158 See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (“It is the further purpose of this chapter to . . . encourage State and 
local governments to make appropriate land use adjustments to constrict the development of land 
which is exposed to flood damage and minimize damage caused by flood losses . . . .”). 
 159 Sarah Fox, This Is Adaptation: The Elimination of Subsidies Under the National Flood Insur-
ance Program, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 215–16 (2014) (describing “voluntary incentive system 
that offers community-wide discounts on insurance premiums in exchange for additional flood mitiga-
tion measures”). 
 160 See, e.g., Beth Davidson, How Quickly We Forget: The National Flood Insurance Program 
and Floodplain Development in Missouri, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 366 (2005) (discussing 
Missouri’s failure to generate sound land use under the National Flood Insurance Program). 
 161 See Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays, Repeatedly, the Crit-
ics Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/science/earth/as-
coasts-rebuild-and-us-pays-again-critics-stop-to-ask-why.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/99YQ-KD8V] 
(discussing the correlation between the availability of federal subsidies to rebuild disaster prone areas 
and “repetitive risk taking” in those areas). Recently, interest-group pressure caused Congress to back 
pedal on changes that would have taken costs into account in setting flood-insurance rates. See Alex-
ander B. McDonnell, Note, The Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012: Temporarily 
Curtailed by the Homeowner Flood Insurance Act of 2014—a Respite to Forge an Enduring Correc-
tion to the National Flood Insurance Program Built on Virtuous Economic and Environmental Incen-
tives, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 235, 239–240 (2015). 
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overrides the individual preferences of property owners, society ought to be 
willing to acknowledge that policy choice rather than pretending that buyouts 
are “designed to give homeowners the ability to choose the best option for 
their individual situation.”162 
b. Tender Offers 
 When Congress sought to protect shareholders from coercive tender of-
fers, it “relied primarily on disclosure to implement the purpose.”163 Although 
the Williams Act does not preclude more intrusive state regulation of tender 
offers, the federal approach assumes that it is possible to create a functioning 
market for corporate control. To facilitate the market, the Williams Act re-
quires offerors to disclose their intentions and to leave their bids open for at 
least twenty business days so that shareholders can proceed on an informed 
basis and so that another bidder can emerge.164 The goal of the Williams Act is 
not to encourage or discourage takeovers but to enable shareholders to make 
that decision for themselves.165 
State laws and judicial decisions that empower boards of directors to act 
as gatekeepers embody a more skeptical view of the operation of unimpeded 
markets. For example, New York’s business combination statute was “designed 
to discourage hostile corporate takeovers by limiting the ability of an individu-
al or corporation acquiring shares in a New York corporation to ‘engage in any 
business combination’ with the target corporation for a period of five years 
unless the Board of Directors of the target corporation approves of the stock 
acquisition.”166 According to this skeptical perspective, even a fully informed 
shareholder might make an unintelligent choice to sell—in which case, manag-
ers can protect value by blocking that choice.167 The difference between share-
holders and managers is not a matter of native intelligence but one of rational 
motivation. To the extent shareholders lack the incentive to acquire and pro-
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cess information, a corporation’s managers may be better able to assess val-
ue.168 Ultimately, the question is “who decides? The shareholders or, as with 
all other important policy questions, is it initially a decision for the board?”169 
Whether or not the intervention of a corporation’s managers can produce 
more value for shareholders than the unfettered operation of a market for cor-
porate control is a difficult question. Among other things, it implicates the fun-
damental tension in corporate law between “authority and accountability.”170 If 
the question is whether the problem of collective coercion in tender offers re-
quires a choice-substituting approach, however, the answer appears to be “no.” 
As Delaware courts have acknowledged, an all-cash tender offer for all shares 
of a corporation that also promises to execute a back-end merger at the same 
price is not coercive.171 From a market perspective, therefore, the choice-
enhancing provisions of the Williams Act provide an adequate solution to the 
problem. 
CONCLUSION 
When a collective-choice situation places coercive pressure on individual 
participants, the law’s traditional protection of individual autonomy against 
coercion must be reconciled with its necessary role in resolving problems of 
collective action. On the one hand, the law might seek to remove coercion 
from the equation so that individuals are free to make their own decisions. On 
the other hand, the law might empower a central authority to decide the ques-
tion, thereby solving a problem of collective action in order to maximize the 
group’s shared interests. 
The tension between these two approaches creates deep uncertainty for 
the regulation of collective-choice situations. It is palpable in the law’s con-
flicted response to corporate takeover bids in that applicable federal and state 
laws simultaneously enhance and diminish shareholder choice. Elsewhere—for 
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example, the structure of government buyout programs, or the imposition of 
mandatory fees for nonunion employees—the intersection of coercion and col-
lective choice may be overlooked altogether. By situating the literature on co-
ercion in the context of offers that exploit collective-action problems, this Arti-
cle proposes a unifying framework for identifying and remedying problems of 
collective coercion. 
  
 
